Reid’s philosophy is an attempt to describe the operations of the mind. The author is less concerned with objects than with the power or faculty by means of which the mind is furnished with objects. This faculty he calls conception or apprehension or understanding, and he is careful always to distinguish it from the power of judgment by means of which we come to possess belief or knowledge. Much of what is most distinctive in Reid’s philosophy is to be found (...) in his account of these two faculties and of the way in which they are related to each other. (shrink)

There are many things which may legitimately be called history of philosophy. My concern is not to enumerate these. When I ask, “What is history of philosophy?” I am raising questions of importance and relevance rather than questions of fact. I mean to inquire what history of philosophy must be if it is to meet at the same time the historian’s demand for accuracy and the philosopher’s demand for significance.